Taiwan, China, and TSMC 完整註解
閱讀前你該知道的事
TSMC 作為全球最大的半導體製造商，若落入中國之手，中國得以控制世界經濟。美國新聞網站Semafor也曾在 2023年3月的報導中寫道，若中國成功入侵台灣，美國將摧毀台灣先進的半導體產業，「美國及其盟友永遠不會讓那些工廠落入中國手中」。不過本文的作者 David Sacks 卻對此計畫懷有疑慮，他認為毀滅台灣的半導體製造設施(fabs) 不僅不必要，可能還會造成反效果。
Planning to destroy Taiwan’s fabs is unnecessary and discussing such a possibility is counterproductive.
閱讀前你該知道的詞彙
semiconductor 半導體
semi 半、部分
conductor 導體
fab 半導體製造廠
politics 政治
deter (v.) /deterrence (n.) 威懾
閱讀全文 >> Threatening to Destroy TSMC Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive
In recent years, some have advocated that the United States should plan to destroy Taiwan’s semiconductor fabrication facilities (or “fabs” in industry speak) both to deter a Chinese assault and to ensure that China does not inherit Taiwan’s semiconductor industry if deterrence fails and China successfully annexes Taiwan. Such an idea, however, overstates the importance of semiconductors in cross-strait dynamics and reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the semiconductor industry. A policy of destroying the heart of Taiwan’s economy would also help China sow distrust among Taiwanese people toward the United States and undermine Taiwan’s will to resist Chinese aggression.
deter (v.) /deterrence (n.) 威懾
cross-strait dynamics 兩岸關係
cross-strait 海峽兩岸
dynamics 互動、關係
sow 播種。sow seeds 就是「播下種子」，文中用sow distrust 意思就是「播下不信任的種子」
近年來，有些人主張美國應該計劃摧毀台灣的半導體製造廠（業界又稱為“fabs”）來威懾中國的攻擊，並確保如果威懾失敗而中國成功吞併(annex)台灣時，中國不會繼承台灣的半導體產業。然而，作者 David Sacks 認為這種想法過分強調(overstates) 半導體在兩岸關係(cross-strait dynamics)中的重要性，並顯示出對半導體行業的誤解。David 認為這種摧毀台灣經濟核心的政策也會幫助中國在台灣人民中播下對美國的不信任種子，並削弱台灣抵抗中國侵略的意志。
台積電TSMC 的市場占比
Taiwan dominates the production of semiconductors, with its companies holding 68 percent of global market share, while Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces around 90 percent of the world’s leading-edge semiconductors. These chips provide computing power for everything from smartphones to weapons and cars, many of which require thousands of chips to function.
Although American companies design the world’s leading chips, the United States lacks the capacity to produce cutting-edge chips and is dependent on chips manufactured in Taiwan. U.S. fabs produced 37 percent of the world’s chips in 1990, but this number fell by nearly two-thirds to 13 percent by 2010. Losing access to Taiwanese chips would cause many of the biggest U.S. companies, from Apple to General Motors, to struggle to produce anything.
leading-edge / leading / cutting-edge 都有「先進的」、「高端」的意思
capacity 這裡指「能耐、能力」
台灣主宰半導體的生產，其公司的全球市佔率為68％，而台積電 (TSMC) 更是生產約90％世界最先進的半導體。這些芯片為各種產品提供計算能力(computing power)，從智能手機到武器和汽車等，其中許多產品甚至需要數千個芯片來運作。
儘管是美國公司負責設計這些芯片，但美國缺乏生產高端芯片的能力，只能依賴台灣。美國的半導體工廠在1990年生產了全球37％的芯片，但到2010年這一數字下降了近三分之二(two thirds)，降至13％。若是無法取得台灣芯片，許多美國最大的公司，從蘋果(Apple)到通用汽車(General Motors)將難以生產任何產品。
存在的風險
To be sure, reliance on a single place (and in some instances even a single building) for computing needs is a significant vulnerability. That these fabs are located on an island prone to earthquakes, one that China has vowed to bring under its control, by force if necessary, is cause for concern. Some fear that if China were to annex Taiwan and take control of these fabs, it could cut off chip exports to the United States and use the world’s most advanced chips to turbocharge its military modernization.
vulnerability 弱點; weakness
prone to ... 容易... （一般是用於不好的事情）
turbocharge 促進、推動、增強
turbo 是「渦輪」，俚語中意思就是「強大」的意思。turbocharge 有「大力增強」的感覺
當然，依賴單一地點（有時甚至依賴單一建築物）來供給全世界的運算需求是一個巨大的 vulnerability。這些半導體製造設施位於一個容易地震的島嶼上，一個中國曾發誓要以必要的手段將其納入自己的控制之下的島嶼，這是十分令人擔憂的。有些人擔心，如果中國吞併台灣並控制這些半導體製造設施，中國將可以停止芯片出口到美國，並使用他們製造出來的先進芯片來加速軍事發展 (Modernization 使更現代化、更高科技)。
Recognizing this vulnerability, the United States in recent years has taken steps to reshore some semiconductor manufacturing capacity: the Trump administration encouraged TSMC to open a fab in Arizona, while in 2022 Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which provides $52.7 billion to jumpstart domestic semiconductor manufacturing.
jumpstart 「啟動」（一般用於透過外接電池來快速啟動引擎，像是車子沒電而用另一台車的電池來啟動那樣）
意識到這個 vulnerability，近年來美國已採取措施，重新在把半導體製造能力遷回自己國內。川普政府(Trump administration) 鼓勵台積電在 Arizona州設立製造工廠(fab)，同時在2022年，國會通過了CHIPS和Science法案，提供了527億美元的資金來啟動國內半導體製造。
最壞的打算
他們在論壇中到底講了什麼？這裡有完整的談話內容（已翻譯成中文），看完後會更好理解下面的段落。
Some analysts believe this is still not enough: Taiwan’s fabs are simply too important, they argue, to risk them falling into China’s hands. Instead, the United States or Taiwan should make clear that they would destroy Taiwanese fabs during a conflict. A 2021 paper published in The U.S. Army War College Quarterly argued that the best way to deter Chinese aggression was for the United States and Taiwan to “lay plans for a targeted scorched-earth strategy that would render Taiwan not just unattractive if ever seized by force, but positively costly to maintain. This could be done most effectively by threatening to destroy facilities belonging to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company.” Former U.S. national security advisor Robert O’Brien recently resurrected this line of thinking, advocating for destroying Taiwan’s fabs and comparing such a move to Britain’s decision to sink France’s naval fleet after the country surrendered to Nazi Germany.
render ..A.. ..(形容詞).. 使得 A (形容詞)
Ex. The accident rendered the couple unconscious. 車禍使這對情侶(couple) 沒有意識。
resurrect 「復活」。文中指 O'Brien 在今年(2023) 再次「復活」摧毀台灣半導體的想法（2021 年就有被提過）。
一些學者認為這仍然不夠：他們認為台灣的半導體製造設施太重要，不能冒險讓它們落入中國手中。他們認為美國或台灣應該明確表示，在衝突爆發時他們將摧毀台灣的半導體製造設施。2021年發表在 The U.S. Army War College Quarterly（美國陸軍戰爭學院季刊）上的一篇論文主張，阻止中國侵略的最佳方法是讓美國和台灣 制定一個針對性的焦土政策，使台灣不僅在被武力占領時變得 unattractive，而且維護成本相當昂貴。其中最有效的方法就是威脅摧毀 TSMC 的設施。 前美國國家安全顧問 Robert O'Brien 最近又重新提出了這種想法，主張摧毀台灣的半導體製造設施，並將這一舉措與英國在法國投降給納粹德國後決定沉沒法國海軍艦隊的決定相比較。(在二戰期間，在法國投降後，為了防止法國海軍艦隊落入敵國手中，法國政府於1940年6月27日下令在土倫的法國艦隊基地進行自沉。)
Such analysis vastly overstates the importance of semiconductors to the decision-making of China’s leadership. China’s desire to control Taiwan predates semiconductors and its determination to achieve this political objective would be just as strong if Taiwan were a poor, agrarian society. If China chooses to use force against Taiwan, it will do so having accepted the economic costs and consequences. Thus, the prospect of inheriting TSMC is unlikely to drive China to use force, while the prospect of taking over an island with a destroyed semiconductor industry is unlikely to restrain Beijing. A plan to eliminate Taiwan’s fabs will not bolster deterrence.
predates 早於... comes before
agrarian 農業的
bolster 支持、支撐; support
David 認為這種分析極大地過分強調半導體對中國決策的重要性。首先，中國控制台灣的渴望早於台灣半導體產業的興起，即使台灣是一個貧窮的農業社會，中國實現這個政治目標的決心依然同樣堅定。如果中國選擇對台灣使用武力，它也會接受所需付出的經濟成本和後果。因此，繼承台積電的前景不太可能是促使中國使用武力的動力，而一個半導體產業被摧毀的島嶼也不太可能會制止北京。 作者認為，這項計劃不會有威懾的效果。
Second, discussion of destroying Taiwan’s most famous industry and the source of much pride among Taiwanese is a gift to Chinese Communist Party propagandists, who have sought to weaponize this discourse. In February 2023, Chinese state media accounts began discussing the Biden administration’s alleged “plan for the destruction of Taiwan.” The following month, China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang rhetorically asked, “Why does the U.S. keep on professing the maintenance of regional peace and stability, while covertly formulating a ‘plan for the destruction of Taiwan’?” After O’Brien made his comments and subsequently received an award from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson commented, “Honoring such an individual shows that [Democratic Progressive Party] authorities do not mean it when they say they love Taiwan. The truth is they have been selling Taiwan away.”
China is using this opening to spread the narrative that the United States is not a trustworthy partner, that U.S. and Taiwanese interests are not aligned, and that the United States views Taiwan as a pawn in a larger geopolitical contest with China. This is a boon to Beijing’s long-term strategy of chipping away at the confidence of the Taiwanese people, in the hope that the Taiwanese public will support political leaders who favor negotiated acquiescence to its political demands. The notion that one needs to destroy Taiwan in order to save it is also likely to undermine the willingness of Taiwanese people to resist.
propaganda 政治宣傳
discourse 「言論」。文中提到 weaponize this discourse 意思就是說把考慮摧毀台灣半導體的這些言論化成武器，利用它來達到對中共有利的政治宣傳。
rhetorically 這裡用來修飾 ask a question。指他問這個問題是為了表達某個觀點，並不是真正想要你回答。文中秦剛問道「Why does the U.S. keep on professing the maintenance of regional peace and stability, while covertly formulating a ‘plan for the destruction of Taiwan’?”」不是真的想知道原因，這麼問只是用來指責美國不是真正想幫助台灣。
narrative 事件的敘述。set the narrative/spread the narrative 有「透過事件的敘述來帶動風向」的意思
aligned 一致的、對齊的
pawn 棋盤上的「兵」「卒」「棋子」
boon 有用之物、恩惠
acquiescence 默許、不情願地同意、妥協
第二，討論破壞台灣最著名產業和台灣人引以為傲的產業反而是給中國propaganist 的禮物。他們會利用這些言論來達到對中共有利的政治宣傳。
2023年2月，中國官方媒體開始討論拜登政府(Biden Administration) 所謂的“摧毀台灣計劃”。次月，中國國務委員兼外交部長秦剛 rhetorically 提出疑問，「為什麼美國一直宣稱維護區域和平與穩定，卻暗中制定了一個‘摧毀台灣計劃’？」在O'Brien 發表評論並隨後獲得台灣總統蔡英文頒發獎項後，中國外交部發言人也評論說到，「表彰這樣的個人，表明民進黨不是真正的愛台灣，事實是，他們一直在出賣台灣。」
中國正在利用這個機會來帶動風向，傳播「美國不是一個值得信賴的夥伴」、「美國和台灣的利益不一致」、「美國只是將台灣視為在與中國的政治競爭中的棋子」這類的言論。北京正試圖削弱台灣人民的信心，希望台灣公眾支持會對中國政策妥協的領袖，而這個摧毀計畫反而對於北京的這個長期策略有所幫助。David 認為，為了拯救台灣而摧毀台灣的想法也會削弱台灣人民抵抗的意願。
Third, and most importantly, destroying Taiwan’s fabs is unnecessary because the United States could render them inoperable to the PRC without even using physical force. The facilities need continued access to U.S. and allied technologies and equipment to function, and if China were to gain control over Taiwan, the United States could simply bar U.S. companies from providing the necessary support. As Chris Miller details in Chip War, “U.S. companies like Applied Materials, Lam Research, and KLA are part of a small oligopoly of companies that produce irreplaceable machinery, like the tools that deposit microscopically thin layers of materials on silicon wafers or recognize nanometer-scale defects. Without this machinery—much of it still built in the U.S.—it’s impossible to produce advanced semiconductors.” Lacking access to U.S. machinery, the semiconductor firms China would inherit would be unable to maintain existing equipment, much less keep pace with their competitors in an industry characterized by rapid advances.
bar ..A.. from (doing...) 禁止 A 做...
oligopoly 「寡占」，少數幾家生產者壟斷市場
silicon wafer 「矽晶圓」，半導體材料
defect 「缺陷」
第三，也是最重要的一點，其實沒有必要毀掉台灣的fabs，因為美國不需要使用武力就能使這些製造廠無法運作。這些 fabs 需要有美國和盟國的技術和設備才能運作，如果中國獲得對台灣的控制，美國可以直接地禁止美國公司提供必要的支持。正如 Chris Miller 在 Chip War 一書中所說，「像Applied Materials、LAM Research和KLA等美國公司是其中幾個寡占芯片市場的公司，他們生產不可取代的機器設備，比如在矽晶圓(silion wafers)上塗上薄層材料的設備，或檢測奈米級缺陷(nanometer-scale defects) 的工具。如果沒有這些在美國製造的機器，就不可能生產先進的半導體。」少了美國的機械設備和支援，中國將繼承的台灣半導體公司也將無法維護現有的設備，更不可能在這個充滿快速進步的行業中跟上其他的競爭對手。
Concern about over-reliance on Taiwan for the majority of the world’s chips and nearly all of the most advanced chips is warranted. To address this vulnerability, the United States should do more to rebuild its domestic semiconductor industry: ensuring that the funds provided through the CHIPS Act are used effectively, reforming its immigration system to enable talented engineers to stay in the country, and building a pipeline of engineering talent that can work on semiconductor manufacturing. Planning to destroy Taiwan’s fabs, however, is unnecessary, and discussing such a possibility is counterproductive.
過度依賴台灣來提供芯片的擔憂是合理的。為了解決這個弱點，美國應該更多地重建其國內的半導體產業，確保通過CHIPS法案提供的資金被有效使用，改革其移民體制使得優秀的工程師能夠留下，並建立可以參與半導體製造的人才儲備。然而，計劃摧毀台灣的半導體製造設施是不必要的，可能還會造成反效果。